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Ivory crisis: Growing 
no-trade consensus 
In their Perspective, “Breaking the 
deadlock on ivory” (15 December 2017, 
p. 1378), D. Biggs et al. propose steps to 
enhance unity around the African elephant 
poaching crisis. We support their recom-
mendations for dialogue among African 
elephant range states. However, the 
Perspective misrepresents the evidence-
driven rationale of the no-trade approach 
to ivory, promotes a counterproductive 
geographically divided approach to wildlife 
trade, and understates the growing world-
wide policy consensus to end ivory trade.
 By asserting that a no-trade approach is 
motivated by “sacred” values and mis-
identifying animal rights as central to this 
position, Biggs et al. imply that the no-trade 
approach is not pragmatic. In fact, the no-
trade position and the pro-trade position 
differ not only in core values or objectives, 
but in interpretations of evidence on the 
relative usefulness of improved gover-
nance, markets, and sociocultural change 
in addressing poaching. It would be ideal if 
only ivory from naturally deceased ele-
phants could be used to fund conservation 
sustainably. However, the evidence suggests 
that this cannot be practically achieved for 
elephants. Economic models supporting 
ivory sales ignore elephants’ low population 
and productivity (1). Thus, new demand for 
ivory will likely outpace new legal sup-
ply, increase black market prices (2), and 
further incentivize elephant poaching in 
countries struggling to patrol vast areas (3). 
Legal trade also makes it more difficult to 
detect contraband (4) and fails to address 
the escalating levels of criminality driving 
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most ivory shipments over the past decade 
(5). A one-time legal ivory sale to China 
and Japan permitted by the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) in 2008 corresponded 
with an abrupt increase in poaching (2). 
In contrast, the 1989 ban on international 
ivory trade and decisions to restrict legal 
domestic trade from 2015 onward were 
each accompanied by at least a halving of 
the price of ivory (6, 7).   
Elephant conservation would suffer under 
Biggs et al.’s proposal for further regional dif-
ferentiation of ivory trade policies. Any legal 
trade in ivory undermines efforts to reduce 
elephant poaching everywhere (2). All 37 
African elephant range states have expressed 
shared conservation objectives in the 2010 
African Elephant Action Plan (8) and should 
be regarded as equal stakeholders. That 76% 
of African elephants live in transboundary 
populations (9) necessitates cooperation 
between neighbors and continent-wide 
management approaches. These approaches 
could include identifying revenue sources to 
replace ivory sales for pro-trade countries, as 
Biggs et al. suggest. CITES’ legitimacy would 
be undermined by devolving its authority 
or making decisions “outside of the public’s 
view,” as proposed by Biggs et al. Decreasing 
public scrutiny during negotiations could 
increase vulnerability to commercial inter-
ests or assertive governments focused on 
short-term benefits (10).  
In contrast to the “deadlock” portrayed 
by Biggs et al., a global consensus is grow-
ing for a complete ban on trade in ivory 
to combat elephant poaching. Biggs et al. 
themselves recognized current near-total 
domestic bans on ivory trade (in the United 
States, China, and the United Kingdom) 
and the motion to stop all legal domestic 
sales adopted at the 2016 IUCN World 
Conservation Congress. Additionally, since 
2010, Parties to CITES have dismissed 
proposals for sales of stockpiled ivory and 
rejected a decision-making mechanism that 
could reestablish trade (11).  
Instead of perpetuating demand for ivory 
through sales, we suggest that demand 
be minimized through a combination of 
regulatory instruments (domestic trade 
bans) and sociocultural interventions 
(behavior change campaigns). Other strate-
gies include dismantling supply chains 
using intelligence-driven law enforce-
ment; strengthening judicial systems; and 
encouraging cross-border cooperation, 
human-elephant coexistence projects, and 
alternative economic opportunities for 
poachers and traders. Combining nature-
compatible livelihoods with strengthened 
revenue streams from elephant-oriented 
tourism could—if well-governed—promote 
equitable development and participatory 
conservation across rural Africa (12).
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Ivory crisis: Role of 
bioprinting technology
We agree with D. Biggs et al. (“Breaking 
the deadlock on ivory,” Perspectives, 15 
December 2017, p. 1378) that to prevent the 
extinction of elephants, we must recognize 
that different values influence stakeholders’ 
perspectives. Poaching is increasingly driven 
by demand from China, with its growing 
number of wealthy consumers and inves-
tors and its traditions of ivory usage (1). 
Moreover, ivory prices have increased con-
siderably since 2000 (1–3), indicating that 
it is a good investment. Altering consumer 
preferences alone through changing mental 
models, as Biggs et al. propose, is unlikely 
to reduce the demand for ivory and prevent 
the killing of elephants. Policy-makers must 
take a broader systems-thinking approach, 
whereby they consider not only how people 
value ivory psychologically but also how 
technology can be used to influence under-
lying economic demand and supply levers of 
the ivory trade, and ultimately its price.
Developments in three-dimensional 
(3D) bioprinting have made it possible to 
produce an indistinguishable substitute 
of elephant ivory and rhino horn. Using 
a small sample of tissue, the machine can 
replicate the species’ DNA precisely in the 
printed version (4–6). Bioprinting offers 
several potential options for substantially 
reducing the market price for ivory. For 
example, if large volumes of bioprinted 
ivory were successfully introduced into 
African ivory markets (mixed, with-
out detection, with the genuine ivory), 
then this ivory would likely pass further 
through the supply chain and into the 
black markets of Asia. A recent experiment 
shows that such an intervention is indeed 
possible (7). Mixing substantial volumes 
of bioprinted ivory into the supply chain, 
would not only increase supply and reduce 
the price, but also create information 
uncertainty among investors as to whether 
they are buying genuine ivory. This 
strategy has been shown to be effective in 
combating the shark fin trade (8).
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Response
Sekar et al. argue that there is unequivocal 
evidence that ivory trade bans are neces-
sary for conserving elephants, and that a 
growing consensus removes the need to 
consider or incorporate alternative values 
in this debate. In doing so, they overlook 
relevant literature [e.g., (1–3)] and do not 
account for marginalized voices from key 
range states (4). Their response illustrates 
why the current impasse is unlikely to be 
resolved without a new structured process, 
underpinned by recognition that interpre-
tation of scientific information on both 
sides of any contentious debate is influ-
enced by values (5, 6).
Sekar et al. describe apparently com-
pelling evidence for the consequences of 
different policies relating to ivory, but 
there is much literature that contests their 
conclusions (1–3, 7). For example, before 
the 17th Conference of the Parties (CoP), a 
technical advisory group of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) took the unusual step 
of issuing a formal statement about the 
methodologic al shortcomings of one of the 
key working papers Sekar et al. cite (3, 8). 
Sekar et al. also cite the motion adopted at 
IUCN’s 2016 World Conservation Congress 
to prohibit legal domestic ivory sales 
as illustrating consensus. However, this 
debate was so adversarial that a diverse 
group of 30 prominent individuals, span-
ning 20 countries and including people 
from eight nongovernmental organiza-
tions and seven governments, publicly 
highlighted its pitfalls and urged for this 
approach to be avoided in the future (9).
This lack of consensus explains why 
different range states, all of which are 
committed to conserving elephants and all 
with access to the same data sets, continue 
to take opposing positions, illustrating how 
interpretation of evidence often reflects 
underlying assumptions, value systems, 
and mental models (10, 11). Our paper 
acknowledged that there is policy momen-
tum toward a trade ban, but called for a 
new process because polarized debates per-
sist between and among range states and 
researchers. If this polarization continues, 
it will undermine policy implementation.
Despite Sekar et al.’s claim, our propos-
als would not undermine the legitimacy of 
CITES. Instead, we highlighted that experi-
ence from other contentious issues, such as 
negotiating climate change policy and the 
end to armed conflict, shows that progress 
is more likely through iterations of discus-
sion in small groups by key stakeholders, 
rather than in adversarial public environ-
ments such as CITES CoPs (12, 13). Such an 
approach could be facilitated by CITES and 
feed into CITES processes, as happened 
with the African Elephant Range State 
Dialogues (14). We also reiterate that range 
states, which are the ultimate custodians 
of Africa’s elephants, should own and lead 
this process to develop policies that navi-
gate the trade-offs their societies face.
We did not advocate a particular policy 
position, but instead called for a structured 
process to overcome the barriers to evi-
dence-based decision-making. This should 
account for the different values and mental 
models that influence this debate, building 
consensus on how the available evidence is 
interpreted and what research is needed to 
tackle uncertainties and data gaps. 
We agree with Sekar et al. that any 
process to build consensus must incorpo-
rate the need for sustainable financing to 
protect elephants from poaching and other 
threats like habitat loss. Such financing 
also needs to provide economic benefits 
to communities that live with elephants. 
Critically, to strengthen sustainability, 
policy processes on ivory must give more 
of a voice to those responsible for and 
affected by policy decisions than to those 
who suffer none of the costs of living with 
elephants. Overcoming this long-standing 
deadlock requires a new approach; 
conservation can learn from successes in 
other polarized debates to achieve lasting 
positive outcomes for elephants and other 
iconic taxa threatened by illegal trade.
We agree with Lenda et al. that synthetic 
ivory might provide new solutions, but it 
could also have unintended negative conse-
quences by changing the nature and size of 
the ivory trade in unpredictable ways. There 
is already an effort within CITES to address 
the issue of synthetically produced wildlife 
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adopting the structured process we propose.
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 Insurance coverage for 
genomic tests
On 16 March, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced 
that Medicare will cover Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)–approved or cleared 
genomic tests that encompass broad gene 
panels for advanced cancer patients (1). 
The final policy does not include the initial 
draft’s proposed “coverage with evidence 
development” (CED)—i.e., coverage of tests 
run as part of clinical trials and registries—
which some had argued should be applied 
to develop a stronger evidence base for 
these tests (2). Instead, tests not already 
approved in the national coverage deter-
mination can be reviewed for coverage by 
local Medicare Administrative Contractors 
(MACs). The new policy reflects a substan-
tial shift in determining how genomic tests 
are evaluated for coverage, which pro-
vides a needed “roadmap” for coverage. 
However, to develop effective and efficient 
policies, stakeholders should support 
further research to address how the new 
policy will affect ongoing cancer research 
as well as the access to and affordability 
of next-generation sequencing testing for 
cancer patients. 
The new policy has the potential to 
increase access to testing, but it may 
remain out of reach for many patients. 
Private payers may not follow the CMS 
policy for covered tests, as there are 
myriad reasons that payers have limited 












(3), and private payers often do not use 
Medicare policies as precedents (4). The 
tests that remain uncovered by CMS may 
not be covered by local MACs either (5). 
The numerous laboratories that offer their 
own tests that do not currently meet the 
coverage requirements in the new policy 
may have trouble finding the trial partici-
pants and funding they need to obtain the 
evidence required. Although CMS’s policy 
may spur these laboratories to develop 
evidence even without a CED requirement, 
this process may take several years, and its 
outcome is uncertain (4). The CMS policy 
is binding only on Medicare; it is uncertain 
whether states will cover these tests for 
Medicaid patients (6). 
Likewise, the policy may increase afford-
ability and equity for these tests, but with 
caveats. Benefit-cost tradeoffs were not 
examined as they are outside the scope 
of CMS. CMS is caught in an ongoing 
dilemma: Coverage policies are determined 
irrespective of cost, yet there is a constant 
drumbeat of calls to reduce Medicare 
expenditures (7). Lastly, it will be impor-
tant to understand the implications of the 
new policy for genomic tests for patients 
with other types of cancer and with other 
conditions, which face similar challenges 
to coverage (8).  
Given today’s challenging health policy 
environment, CMS should work with stake-
holders, including other federal agencies, 
to carefully evaluate the benefits and risks 
of this novel coverage approach and to con-
sider what additional policy mechanisms 
will be needed to ensure that the necessary 
evidence is generated. We must address the 
substantial uncertainty about the impact of 
coverage policies on the health outcomes 
of Medicare beneficiaries. 
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